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CAUSATION AND APPORTIONMENT ISSUES IN OPIOID
LITIGATION
RICHARD C. AUSNESS*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In November 2019, an Oklahoma trial court judge, sitting without a jury,
ruled that Johnson & Johnson and its subsidiary Janssen Pharmaceuticals
were guilty of creating a public nuisance because their production and
marketing of prescription opioid painkillers significantly contributed to the
current opioid epidemic in the State of Oklahoma. The judge also held that
Johnson & Johnson must contribute $465 million to pay for the State’s
program to abate this nuisance.1 Although the case has been appealed, it is
significant because it was the first government sponsored opioid case to
actually go to trial. Although there are many issues raised by the Johnson
& Johnson case,2 and by other opioid cases yet to be tried, this Article will
focus on only one: namely, whether it is appropriate to hold one defendant
liable for the cost of correcting a social problem caused by the wrongful
conduct of many other actors. The Article concludes that some form of
market share liability is a better approach than traditional joint and several
liability for resolving certain kinds of mass tort cases.
Part II examines the origins of the current opioid epidemic and the
litigation that has resulted from it. Part II identifies the various approaches
Copyright © 2021, Richard C. Ausness.
* Stites & Harbison Professor of Law, University of Kentucky Rosenberg College of Law;
B.A., 1966 and J.D., 1968, University of Florida; LL.M., 1973, Yale Law School. I would
like to thank the University of Kentucky Rosenberg College of Law for supporting this
research with a summer research grant.
1 The State originally sought $17 billion over 30 years to pay for cost of a 30-year
abatement program. Colin Dwyer & Jackie Fortier, Oklahoma Judge Shaves $107 Million
Off Opioid Decision Against Johnson & Johnson, NPR (Nov. 21, 2019, 4:00 PM)
https://www.kcur.org/2019-11-21/oklahoma-judge-shaves-107-million-off-opioid-decisionagainst-johnson-johnson [https://perma.cc/WK2N-2EMZ]. The $465 million award only
covers the first year of the abatement program. Id. Therefore, Johnson & Johnson’s ultimate
liability may be much greater if it has to pay for the entire multi-year abatement program. Id.
2 The case was officially styled State ex rel. Hunter v. Purdue Pharma L.P. See generally
No. CJ-2017-816, 2019 Okla. Dist. LEXIS 3486 (Okla. Dis. Ct. Aug. 26, 2019). However,
Johnson & Johnson and its subsidiary, Janssen Pharmaceuticals, were the only defendants
left by the time the case went to trial. Accordingly, it will be referred to as the Johnson &
Johnson case. See infra Part II.
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to the issue of cause-in-fact, including the traditional “but for” test, the
Second Restatement’s substantial factor test and the Third Restatement’s
necessary element of a sufficient set (NESS) test. It concludes that the court
could have found Johnson & Johnson to be a cause in fact of the public
nuisance under the second and third tests, but not the first test. Part III is
concerned with specific causation or product identification. Although this
is not likely to be an issue in opioid litigation, it will be considered because
one approach to the specific causation, market share liability, will play an
important role in the proposal relating to apportionment of damages.
Proximate cause is briefly discussed in Part IV. The article observes
that while an opioid epidemic was certainly foreseeable by the year 2000,
opioid producers continued to promote opioids and distribute excess
amounts of opioid painkiller medicine for another two decades,3 a survey of
handgun and other cases suggests that opioid producers might be able to
claim that the actions of other actors,4 such as prescribing physicians, illegal
drug dealers and patient abuse might break the chain of causation. Part V
examines joint and several liability and apportionment of damages. It finds
that defendants whose concurrent independent acts result in injury to a
plaintiff are often held jointly and severally liable. Finally, Part VI
concludes that joint and several liability is inappropriate in mass tort cases
and argues that courts should apply some form of market share liability
instead.
II. JOHNSON & JOHNSON
The current opioid epidemic is undoubtedly one of the greatest public
health disasters of the twenty-first century.5 Although illegal street drugs,
like heroin and fentanyl, contributed to the problem, prescription opioids
were the principal source of widespread addiction in the country during the
first two decades of the twenty-first century.6
3

See infra Part IV; Paul D. Frederickson, Criminal Marketing: Corporate and
Managerial Liability in the Prescription Drug Industry, 22 MIDWEST L.J. 115, 132–133
(2008). The term “opioid producers” and “opioid sellers” includes manufacturers,
distributors and retail pharmacies.
4
See, e.g., Ashley Cty. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659 (8th Cir. 2009); People ex rel. Spitzer
v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 761 N.Y.S.2d 192 (App. Div. 2003).
5 See Ameet Sarpatwari et al., The Opioid Epidemic: Fixing a Broken Pharmaceutical
Market, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 464 (2017).
6 It should also be mentioned that prescription opioids are often a gateway to the use of
other narcotic substances. Ty McCoy, Note, The Need for Higher Punishment: Lock Up the
Real Drug Dealers, 54 GONZ. L. REV. 47, 56 (2018).
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It all began with OxyContin. OxyContin, a prescription pain reliever
whose active ingredient is oxycodone hydrochloride,7 was developed by
Purdue Pharma and first marketed in 1996.8 It was touted by Purdue as being
superior to other opioids because it contained a time-release mechanism
which allowed a dose to be released over a twelve-hour period of time
instead of the more common four to six hour period.9
Prior to OxyContin’s entry into the market, the accepted practice among
the medical profession was to avoid using opioids to treat chronic pain and
instead limit its use to the treatment of short-term acute pain.10 However, in
the 1980s, a growing number of pain specialists claimed that chronic pain
was being undertreated.11 Relying on this newfound interest in pain
treatment, Purdue urged doctors to prescribe OxyContin to treat
non-malignant chronic pain.12 In order to change existing prescribing
practices, Purdue embarked on a well-funded and sophisticated marketing
campaign to persuade doctors that opioids were effective for treating
moderate chronic pain and that the risk of addiction was not significant.13
Purdue communicated this message to health care providers by direct
advertising and during office visits by their sales representatives.14 The
company also funded seemingly independent key opinion leaders and
organizations who echoed these assurances in medical and scientific journals
and at continuing medical education programs.15 The company also
encouraged physicians to prescribe OxyContin by treating them to

7

Frederickson, supra note 3, at 132.
SAM QUINONES, DREAMLAND: THE TRUE TALE OF AMERICA’S OPIATE EPIDEMIC 124
(2015).
9 Joseph B. Prater, West Virginia’s Painful Settlement: How the OxyContin Phenomenon
and Unconventional Theories of Tort Liability May Make Pharmaceutical Companies Liable
for Black Markets, 100 NW. U.L. REV. 1409, 1413 (2006).
10 QUINONES, supra note 8, at 80.
11 Sarpatwari et al., supra note 5, at 465–66.
12 QUINONES, supra note 8, at 124–27.
13 Lars Noah, Federal Regulatory Responses to the Prescription Opioid Crisis: Too
Little, Too Late?, 2019 UTAH L. REV. 757, 766 (2019).
14 Elizabeth Weeks & Paula Sanford, Financial Impact of the Opioid Crisis on Local
Government: Quantifying Costs for Litigation and Policymaking, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 1061,
1065 (2019).
15 Nino C. Monea, Cities v. Big Pharma: Municipal Affirmative Litigation and the Opioid
Crisis, 50 URB. LAW. 87, 103–04 (2019); Taylor Giancarlo, Pharmaceutical Advertising
Disclosures: Is Less Really More?, 22 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 449, 467–68 (2019).
8
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all-expense-paid conferences at exotic resorts and sponsoring free
pain-related educational programs.16
This marketing campaign was very successful.17 Within a few years of
its introduction into the market, OxyContin became the nation’s most highly
prescribed Schedule II prescription drug.18 Other opioid manufacturers
quickly copied Purdue’s marketing practices. However, as the addiction
problem increased, victims began to bring personal injury actions against
Purdue and other opioid producers. At first, these lawsuits were
unsuccessful, although the cost of defending against them was significant.19
However, the tide began to change in 2014 when hundreds of cities, counties
and states filed lawsuits based on public nuisance and other liability
theories.20 At the present time, opioid litigation is proceeding along three
different, but related tracks. The first consists of lawsuits brought by the
states in state courts; the second includes the thousands of civil actions
brought by local governments which have been transferred to a single district
court under the Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) statute; while the third track
involves a case brought by Purdue Pharma in a federal bankruptcy court.21
The Johnson & Johnson case was the first state case to actually go to
trial.22 In that case, Thad Balkman, a state court trial judge sitting without a
jury, initially awarded the state $572 million, which was later reduced to
$465 million, against Johnson & Johnson and its subsidiary, Janssen.23 The
State alleged that the fraudulent marketing practices of the defendant opioid
producers created a public nuisance in Oklahoma. Originally, the State also
Ashley Duckworth, Note, Fighting America’s Best-Selling Product: An Analysis of and
Solution to the Opioid Crisis, 26 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 237, 257 (2019).
17 Sarpatwari et al., supra note 5, at 467.
18 Dianne E. Hoffmann, Treating Pain v. Reducing Drug Diversion and Abuse:
Recalibrating the Balance in Our Drug Control Laws and Policies, 1 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH
L. & POL’Y 231, 273 (2008).
19 See generally Richard C. Ausness, The Role of Litigation in the Fight Against
Prescription Drug Abuse, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1117, 1122–37 (2014); Frederickson, supra
note 3, at 134 (noting that by the end of 2004, Purdue had spent $250 million defending
against lawsuits by injured consumers).
20
Richard C. Ausness, The Current State of Opioid Litigation, 70 S.C.L. REV. 565, 566–
67 (2019).
21 Richard Ausness, The Future of Opioid Litigation, KY. B ENCH & BAR, Mar./Apr. 2020,
at 20, 22.
22 WEN S. SHEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LSB10365, OVERVIEW OF THE OPIOID
LITIGATION AND RELATED SETTLEMENTS AND SETTLEMENT PROPOSALS 4 (2019).
23 Duckworth, supra note 16, at 261–62.
16
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sued Purdue,24 and Teva,25 but they settled prior to trial, leaving Johnson &
Johnson to face the music alone.
The trial took 33 days and the parties called 42 witnesses, presented 874
exhibits as well as an additional 225 court exhibits.26 The lawyers for the
State argued that Johnson & Johnson contributed to the opioid epidemic in
Oklahoma in two ways. First, Johnson & Johnson and its subsidiary, Janssen
Pharmaceuticals, manufactured and sold Duragesic, a transdermal fentanyl
patch, as well as Nucynta and Nucynta ER, whose active ingredient was an
opioid substance tapentadol.27 Second, Johnson & Johnson, though its
subsidiaries Tasmanian Alkaloids and Noramco, cultivated opium poppy
plants, processed them to manufacture narcotic raw materials, and imported
them into the United States where they were further processed into active
pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs) and sold to other opioid manufacturers.28
According to the State, Johnson & Johnson anticipated the popularity of
OxyContin and other opioids and increased its production of APIs in order
to meet the expected demand.29 This conduct, though not illegal in itself,
contributed to the public nuisance that resulted from the improper use of
prescription opioids.30
The court also charged Johnson & Johnson with engaging in a wide
array of fraudulent marketing practices. These included using key opinion
leaders (KOLs) to influence other doctors, persuading doctors that failure to
treat chronic pain was harming their patients, promoting the concept of
24

See Martha Bebinger, Purdue Pharma Agrees To $270 Million Opioid Settlement With
Oklahoma, WBUR (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.wbur.org/npr/706848006/purdue-pharmaagrees-to-270-million-opioid-settlement-with-oklahoma
[https://perma.cc/S6T8-EBY3].
Purdue and its owners, the Sackler family, agreed to pay $270 million to fund addiction
research and treatment in Oklahoma and pay legal fees. Id. Additionally, $177.5 million was
to fund a new National Center for Addiction Studies and Treatment at Oklahoma State
University, $20 million for medicines for the treatment of patients at the facility, $12.5
million for Oklahoma counties and cities, as well as $60 million for legal fees. Id.
25 Teva agreed to an $85 million settlement with the State of Oklahoma on June 24, 2019.
Wayne Drash, Oklahoma Judge Approves $85 Million Settlement with Opioid Drugmaker
Teva, CNN (June 24, 2019, 5:17 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/06/24/health/tevasettlement-oklahoma/index.html [https://perma.cc/9M42-H4GU].
26 State ex rel. Hunter v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. CJ-2017-816, 2019 Okla. Dist. LEXIS
3486, at *2 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Aug. 26, 2019).
27 Id. at *5–6.
28 Id. at *6–7.
29 Id. at *10–11.
30 Id. at *38.
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pseudoaddiction and directing its sales representatives to claim that opioids
were effective and nonaddictive.31 However, while Johnson & Johnson did
aggressively promote Duragesic and Nucynta, the practices described above
seem to be largely associated with Purdue and others than with Johnson &
Johnson.
After finding Johnson & Johnson guilty of creating a public nuisance,
the court ordered the company to pay the full cost of abating the nuisance.32
Judge Balkman also ruled that Johnson & Johnson was not entitled to any
credit for the money Purdue and Teva had paid to the State in their pretrial
settlement because it had not alleged that they were joint tortfeasors.33 In
addition, the court adopted the State’s “Abatement Plan” (the Plan).34 The
Plan contained a variety of provisions to prevent opioid addiction and to
provide treatment and recovery services for opioid addicts.35 Although the
Plan was multi-year in nature, the court concluded that the State did not
provide sufficient evidence of the time or costs that would be required to
under the Plan to abate the nuisance and, therefore, limited its ward to the
costs of implementing the Plan for one year.36
The trial court’s decision in Johnson & Johnson raised a number of
questions, some of which may be addressed by a higher court on appeal.
First, did Johnson & Johnson’s conduct create a public nuisance? Second,
did the illegal actions of distributors, doctors, pharmacies, drug dealers and
individual abusers operate to break the chain of causation and thereby
constitute superseding causes? Third, does imposing liability on drug
companies for expressions of opinion about the safety and efficacy of their
products interfere with their right of free speech? Fourth, is there any
difference between a damage award and an abatement order? Finally, can
the trial judge direct that the award be earmarked for specific abatement
programs, or must the money be paid into the state treasury?
These are all interesting questions that will undoubtedly arise in other
cases as well. In addition, there are even more issues that were not raised in
the Johnson & Johnson case that are likely to surface in the MDL proceeding
or in other forms of opioid litigation. These include fraud, Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations, conspiracy,
unjust enrichment, negligent marketing, as well as defenses such as lack of
31

Id. at *12–15.
Id. at *44.
33 Id. at *61–62.
34 See id. at *44, *61–63.
35 See id. at *47–61.
36 Id. at *61.
32
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duty, remoteness, federal preemption, running of the statute of limitations,
the economic loss doctrine and the municipal cost recovery rule.37
In any event, this Article is concerned with another issue: namely,
should one pharmaceutical company be held liable for the entire damage to
a government entity when it controlled only a relatively small portion of the
prescription drug market? This will require us to discuss the various tests
for cause-in-fact, defendant identification, joint and several liability and
apportionment of damages.
III. CAUSE-IN-FACT.
The purpose of the cause-in-fact requirement is to ensure that a person
is not subjected to liability for harm to another unless there is some
reasonably significant connection between the defendant’s wrongful
conduct and the plaintiff’s harm.38 As one commentator declared, “[t]here
is no moral or social policy justifying the imposition of liability where
wrongful conduct did not cause the harm or injury.” 39 Perhaps for this
reason, the plaintiff in most cases has the burden of proving this causal link
by a preponderance of the evidence.40 Cause-in-fact should be distinguished
from proximate or legal cause, although the two concepts are often
conflated. Cause-in-fact is concerned with the physical relationship between
the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s harm, while legal cause
presupposes the existence of cause-in-fact and instead focuses on whether
considerations of fairness, pragmatic judgment or social policy support the
imposition of liability on the defendant.41
This portion of the Article will examine various tests for cause-in-fact,
including the but for test, the substantial factor test and the Third
Restatement’s NESS test. We will conclude that the majority but for test
works relatively well in one-cause cases, but it may be too narrow in multiple
cause situations. The other tests work better in these latter scenarios, but
they are far from perfect.
37

See generally Ausness, supra note 20.
David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1671, 1680
(2007).
39
Tory A. Weigand, Tort Law—The Wrongful Demise of But For Causation, 41 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 75, 80 (2019).
40 David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765,
1773–74 (1997). But see Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465, 467 (Cal. 1970) (shifting
the burden of proof as to causation when the plaintiff showed that the defendant violated a
safety statute).
41 Weigand, supra note 39, at 77–78.
38
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A. The But For Test.
The but for or sine qua non test is followed in the majority of states,
particularly when only one cause is involved.42 Under this approach, the
plaintiff must show that his or her injury would not have occurred had it not
been for some action by the defendant.43 Scholars have pointed out that the
test is counterfactual because it determines whether the defendant’s conduct
caused the plaintiff’s harm by asking whether the plaintiff’s harm would
have occurred absent the defendant’s alleged conduct.44 It should be noted
that the but for rule, is primarily a rule of exclusion—that is, it is invoked to
prove the absence of a causal connection between the defendant’s conduct
and the plaintiff’s harm.45
Prosser’s venerable hornbook on the law of torts illustrates a number of
cases involving the but for rule in action.46 Thus, one court held that a
defendant is not liable for failing to have a lifeboat available when a
crewmember sinks without a trace immediately after falling overboard.47
Likewise, a hotel will not be liable for failing to install a fire escape if the
plaintiff dies in his bed from smoke inhalation before the fire reaches him.48
Another court concluded that the defendant’s failure to install crossing
signals a railroad crossing did not cause the plaintiff’s death when his
automobile struck the train’s sixty-eighth car.49 Finally, a court refused to
find that the presence of a railroad embankment caused the plaintiff’s land
to be flooded when the cloudburst that occurred would have flooded it
anyway.50
Government plaintiffs would almost certainly be unable to prove
individual drug companies were a cause-in-fact of the opioid epidemic if the
but for test was used. Numerous parties contributed to the creation of the
opioid problem, including manufacturers, distributors, retail sellers,

42

Owen, supra note 38, at 1681.
Paul J. Zwier, “Cause in Fact” in Tort Law—A Philosophical and Historical
Examination, 31 DEPAUL L. REV. 769, 777 (1982).
44 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 411 (2000); Kenneth S. Abraham, Self-Proving
Causation, 99 VA. L. REV. 1811, 1814–15 (2013); Hillel J. Bavli, Counterfactual Causation,
51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 879, 881 (2019).
45 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 266 (5th ed. 1984).
46 Id. at 265–67.
47 Ford v. Trident Fisheries Co., 122 N.E. 389, 390 (Mass. 1919).
48 Weeks v. McNulty, 48 S.W. 809, 809 (Tenn. 1898).
49 Sullivan v. Boone, 286 N.W. 350, 350–52 (Minn. 1939).
50 Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Sulphur Spring Indep. Sch. Dist., 96 Pa. 65, 65 (Pa. 1880).
43
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overprescribing doctors and even purveyors of illegal street drugs.
Consequently, the plaintiff will be unable to prove that the opioid epidemic
would not have occurred if a particular defendant had acted more
responsibly. It is interesting to observe that Johnson & Johnson raised the
causation issue in a pretrial motion but failed to specifically rely on the but
for test.51 Instead, the company focused more on proximate cause rather
than cause-in-fact.52 Furthermore, in a written opinion at the conclusion of
the trial, Judge Balkman failed to discuss the cause-in-fact at all other than
to declare that he found “that the State has satisfied its burden of proof that
the Defendants’ actions were the cause-in-fact of its injuries.”53 Whatever
test he had in mind, it was not the but for test.
B. The Substantial Factor Test.
Legal scholars agree that the but for test simply does not work in cases
where there are multiple sufficient causes.54 The celebrated Twin Fires case
provides an excellent illustration of this problem.55 In that case, the
plaintiff’s alleged that his property had been destroyed by a fire caused by a
spark from the defendant’s locomotive.56 In response, the defendant
maintained that its fire had merged with other fires in the area before
reaching the plaintiff’s property and, therefore, it was not responsible for the
harm done to the plaintiff’s property.57
The Twin Fires case exemplifies what is referred to as the “combined
forces,” “overdetermined” or “multiple sufficient causes” problem.58 This
occurs when two or more independent forces combine to cause an indivisible
harm. If each factor would be sufficient by itself to cause the resulting harm,
then neither would be regarded as a cause-in-fact under the but for test and

51

See Motion for Judgment of Defendants Johnson & Johnson and Janssen
Pharmaceuticals Inc. and Brief in Support at 59–84, State ex rel. Hunter v. Purdue Pharma,
L.P., No. CJ-2017-816, 2019 Okla. Dist. LEXIS 3486 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Aug. 26, 2019)
[hereinafter Motion for Judgment of Defendants].
52 See id.
53 State ex rel. Hunter v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., No. CJ-2017-816, 2019 Okla. Dist. LEXIS
3486, at *43 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Aug. 26, 2019).
54 Bavli, supra note 44, at 882.
55 See Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 1920)
(modernly known as the Twin Fires case).
56 Id. at 46.
57 Id. at 47–49.
58 Weigand, supra note 39, at 83.
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the plaintiff would lose.59 This result would be particularly unjust if both
factors were the product of negligent conduct.60
In the Twin Fires case, the court held that the plaintiff could recover
only if he was able to prove that the defendant’s fire was a “material factor”
in causing the harm to his property.61 By that it meant that the defendant’s
fire alone would have been sufficient to damage the plaintiff’s property even
if it had not merged with the other fire or fires.62 Thus, the Twin Fires court’s
material factors approach may be characterized as a modification of the
traditional but for test rather than truly independent development.
Nevertheless, it provided a doctrinal foundation for the First and Second
Restatement’s substantial factor test.
The term “substantial factor” made its first appearance in an article
written by Professor Jeremiah Smith.63 Although Professor Smith proposed
the substantial factor criterion as an alternative to the foreseeability principle
in connection with proximate cause, it was later adopted as an alternative to
the but for test by the drafters of the First Restatement of Torts.64 The
substantial factor test was subsequently retained by the drafters of the
Second Restatement of Torts as well.65 The substantial factor test, as it
appeared in the First and Second Restatements, was intended as a response
to the but for test’s failure to adequately deal with multiple sufficient cause
situations as exemplified by the Twin Fires case.66 In addition, it was also
intended to exclude trivial causes from being the basis for liability. 67
Section 431 of the Second Restatement provides that:
The actor’s negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to
another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm, and (b) there is no rule of law relieving the
actor from liability because of the manner in which his
negligence has resulted in the harm.68

59

Id. at 83–84.
Id. at 84.
61 Anderson, 179 N.W. at 49.
62
Id. at 46.
63 Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 303, 309–11 (1912).
64 Weigand, supra note 39, at 81–82.
65 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
66 Weigand, supra note 39, at 84.
67 Id.
68 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
60
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To determine whether the defendant’s action is a substantial factor,
Section 433 states that a court should consider: (1) the number of other
factors that contributed to produce the harm; (2) whether the actor’s conduct
continuously operated to cause the harm or merely created a harmless
situation until acted upon by another party or force; and (3) how much time
had lapsed between the defendant’s action and the harm to the plaintiff.69
Section 432(2) deals with the problem of concurrent causes.70 It declares
that “[i]f two forces are actively operating, one because of the actor’s
negligence, the other not because of any misconduct on his part, and each of
itself is sufficient to bring about the harm, the actor’s negligence may be
found to be a substantial factor in bringing it about.”71
Some courts have taken a more liberal view of what constitutes a
substantial factor and not required a factor to be sufficient in order to be
considered substantial. For example, in People v. ConAgra Grocery
Products Co.,72 the State of California brought a public nuisance action
against two lead-based paint manufacturers and a retail seller of these
products.73 The trial court ordered the defendants to pay $1.15 billion into
a fund to pay for the State’s lead-based paint abatement program.74 On
appeal, the defendants argued that the State had failed to prove that their
promotion of lead-based paint was a substantial factor in causing the alleged
nuisance.75 In response, the court observed that “[t]he substantial factor
standard is a relatively broad one, requiring only that the contribution of the
individual cause be more than negligible or theoretical.”76
The court then described how the defendants’ promotional activities
played a significant role in creating the nuisance in question.77 First, all three
defendants participated in the Lead Industries Association’s (LIA) “Forest
Products” campaign, which began in 1934.78 This marketing scheme
69

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also Weigand,
supra note 39, at 86.
70 2 DAVID G. OWEN & MARY J. DAVIS, OWEN & DAVIS ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 11:4
at 196 (4th ed. 2014); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (AM. LAW INST.
1965).
71 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
72
227 Cal. Rptr. 3d 499 (Ct. App. 2017).
73 Id. at 514.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 543.
76 Id. (quoting Bockrath v. Aldrich Chem. Co., 980 P.2d 398, 403 (Cal. 1999)).
77 Id.
78 Id.
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successfully induced lumber companies to recommend the use of lead-based
paint in residential housing.79 In addition, paint manufacturers and retail
sellers instructed consumers to use only lead-based paints on residential
interiors.80 The court concluded that “at least some of those who were the
targets of these recommendations heeded them.”81 The court apparently
believed that this was sufficient to satisfy the causation requirement and did
not follow the City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co. court’s holding
that the plaintiff identify defendants and products more specifically.82
Although the substantial factor test is arguably superior to the but for
test, at least where multiple causes are involved, it is far from perfect. One
recurring criticism is that its inherent ambiguity leads to inconsistent
results.83 Other commentators complain that phrases such as “substantial
factor” are nothing more than “labels applied to an unexplained
conclusion.”84 As Professor David Fischer has pointed out, the substantial
factor “test offers no real guidance for determining when a factor is
substantial or even a ‘factor.’”85 Nevertheless, some states have extended it
to multiple-cause cases in general, while others have scrapped the but for
test entirely and replaced it with the substantial factor test as an all-purpose
test for causation.86
Viewed solely as a test for cause-in-fact, the Restatement’s version of
the substantial factor approach would provide little help to government
plaintiffs in opioid cases because it would be virtually impossible to prove
that any one defendant had sufficient market share for a jury to conclude that
the current opioid epidemic would not have occurred if a particular
defendant had engaged in fraudulent promotion tactics.87 On the other hand,
a plaintiff may be able to establish cause-in-fact if a court dispenses with the
Restatement’s Section 432(2) requirement in and instead adopts a more
liberal definition of “substantial” by extending it to multiple causes which
are not individually sufficient to cause the plaintiff’s harm.
79
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C. The Third Restatement’s Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set (NESS)
Test.
Dissatisfaction with the analytical weakness of the substantial factor test
led to the development and adoption of the NESS test.88 The NESS test was
first formulated by H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honore,89 and was subsequently
popularized by Professor Richard Wright.90 Later, the Third Restatement of
Torts adopted Professor Wright’s version of the NESS test, a causal set
approach, which states in mathematical terms that a condition contributes to
some consequence “if and only if it was necessary for the sufficiency of a
set of existing antecedent conditions that was sufficient for the occurrence
of the consequence.”91 Simply put, “an unnecessary and insufficient force
or condition is a cause of injury if it joins with other forces or conditions to
contribute to an injury.”92 This approach is potentially useful when there are
multiple causes and none is sufficient by itself to cause the plaintiff’s injury.
Three famous cases illustrate how the NESS test might work. The first is
Corey v. Havener,93 the second is Warren v. Parkhurst,94 and the third is
Northup v. Eakes.95
In Corey v. Havener, two motorcyclists passed the plaintiff’s
horse-drawn wagon at a high rate of speed.96 The noise frightened the
plaintiff’s horse and cause his wagon to overturn.97 Although both
defendants were negligent, they were not acting in concert.98 Nevertheless,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that since it was impossible
to determine what proportion of the plaintiff’s injury was caused by each
defendant, each defendant should be liable for the entire injury since each
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one contributed to it. 99 Under the Third Restatement’s analysis, each
defendant’s conduct, even if they were not independently sufficient
conditions, were still NESS conditions as far as the defendant’s injury was
concerned.100
The Warren v. Parkhurst (Warren) case involved a claim by a riparian
owner that twenty-six upstream mill owners had discharged sewage and
other waste into the stream, causing a terrible stench which affected the
enjoyment of the plaintiff’s property.101 The parties agreed that the actions
of each defendant were not sufficient to cause the damage.102 The court
refused to award damages because it concluded that joint and several
liability was not appropriate and, therefore, each defendant was only liable
for the damage that he or she caused.103 However, the court did conclude
that the lower court could grant an injunction against the defendants
requiring them to reduce their discharges.104
According to Professor Fischer:
[E]ach defendant’s discharge [would be] a NESS
condition. . . . Each defendant’s discharge was necessary
for the sufficiency of a set of existing antecedent conditions
which includes N-1 of the other defendants’ discharges, and
the sufficiency of that set was not preempted, but rather was
reinforced, by the 26-N other defendants’ discharges that
were not included in the description of the sufficient set.105
The Restatement analysis is similar to that of Warren. Each defendant’s
discharge was arguably necessary for the sufficiency of a set of antecedent
conditions and the sufficiency of the set was not affected by the other
discharges that were not included in the sufficient set. In other words, there
were no other conditions involved that would have prevented the
defendants’ discharges from destroying the plaintiff’s barn.
Northup v. Eakes was another water pollution case.106 The plaintiff in
that case sued a number of oil and gas producers who allowed crude oil to
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flow into a nearby creek.107 One day, the oil ignited and the resulting fire
was carried by the wind and current onto the plaintiff’s property where it
burned down a barn and its contents.108 After a certain amount of procedural
skirmishing, the case went to trial and resulted in a judgment for the
plaintiff.109 This decision was affirmed on appeal.110 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court concluded that while each of the defendants acted
independently, allowing their crude oil to flow into the stream combined to
produce a single injury.111 The court concluded that, under these
circumstances, each defendant was responsible for the entire result even
though his or her act alone might not have caused it.112
Applying the NESS test to the Johnson & Johnson case, it is possible
that a court would find Johnson & Johnson’s conduct to be a contributing
cause to the opioid epidemic even though it was not a sufficient cause. As
in Warren and Northup, Johnson & Johnson is one of many alleged
wrongdoers. Warren and Northup make it clear that a particular defendant’s
conduct does not have to be a sufficient condition as long as it is part of a
sufficient set. However, unlike, those cases, a great number of contributors
were not defendants in the case even though they contributed to the harm.
Do Johnson & Johnson’s actions belong to a set that includes all opioid
manufacturers, distributors and sellers? If so, can it be said that its conduct
is necessary to the sufficiency of this set? Although Johnson & Johnson’s
contribution to the problem was not trivial, it may not have been significant
enough to satisfy the NESS requirement either.
D. Causation Issues in Opioid Litigation.
Although Judge Balkman did not place much emphasis on cause-in-fact
in Johnson & Johnson, it will almost certainly be an issue in other cases that
eventually go to trial. How this issue is resolved will depend on which
approach to cause-in-fact that a particular state takes. For example, because
so many opioid manufacturers, distributors, retail sellers and prescribing
physicians have contributed to the opioid addiction epidemic, it would be
hard for a government plaintiff to prove causation under the traditional but
for test since none of the defendants’ conduct, standing alone, would qualify
as a sufficient cause. In theory, proving causation should be easier for a
107
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plaintiff under the substantial factor test. However, the sufficient cause
requirement embodied in the First and Second Restatement’s version of the
test would make it difficult for a government plaintiff to pin liability on any
particular defendant. On the other hand, because Johnson & Johnson’s
contribution was not a sufficient cause of the opioid epidemic, a plaintiff
would have an easier time proving causation if the state followed the more
liberal version of the substantial factor test which does not require that the
defendant’s conduct be a sufficient cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Although
the NESS test is not widely followed, it offered the best test of causation
from the plaintiff’s point of view since the subset of manufacturers,
distributors, retail sellers and prescribing physicians would satisfy the
sufficient cause requirement. Under these circumstances, a defendant could
only avoid being included would be to show that its contribution was
“trivial.”
IV. SPECIFIC CAUSATION.
The traditional but for test not only required the existence of a causal
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, but it also required that
the plaintiff identify the defendant and connect him or her with his injury. 113
The identification or specific causation requirement protected a potential
defendant from having to defend a lawsuit in which the plaintiff was unable
to prove that he or she caused the plaintiff’s injury. 114 Thus, if there were
other possible sources of the harm, the plaintiff would have to identify which
one actually caused the injury.115
This issue arose in City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co.,116 a public
nuisance claim against a number of paint manufacturers to recover for the
costs of removing lead-based paint from private residences.117 During
discovery, the City identified the residences that had incurred costs in
removing lead-based paint, but it was unable to identify any of the
manufacturers whose paint had to be removed in any particular residence.118
Consequently, the trial court ruled in favor of the defendants.119 On appeal,
the City urged the Missouri Supreme Court to adopt a theory whereby
causation could be proved by showing that “the defendant substantially
113
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contributed to the public health hazard created by lead paint via evidence of
‘community wide marketing and sales of lead paint.’”120 However, the court
held that specific causation could only be established by identifying the
actual party who made or sold the product that caused harm to each
particular plaintiff.121
However, some courts have taken a more relaxed view of the causation
requirement. For example, in City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,122 the
court held that the City had shown that the defendant handgun dealers’
marketing practices was a cause of the public nuisance set forth in the City’s
complaint.123 The court observed that the complaint contained “detailed
allegations regarding the dealer defendants’ participation in bringing about
the alleged nuisance, specifically their conduct leading up to and at the point
of sale.”124 The court apparently felt that the City should not have the
impossible burden of identifying which gun dealers’ products caused which
specific gun-related costs that the City incurred.
Over the years, the courts have recognized a number of exceptions to
the traditional identity requirement, particularly when all of the potential
defendants are at fault. These include concert of action, alternative liability
rule, enterprise liability and market share liability. These concepts will only
be considered briefly here since specific causation is not normally a
significant problem in opioid litigation. However, the reasoning behind
some of these doctrines may also be applied to joint liability and
apportionment issues, which are important in opioid litigation, and they will
be examined in that context below.
A. Acting in Concert.
Unlike the more modern theories, concert of action dates back to the
early seventeenth century.125 It imposes vicarious liability on defendants
who participate in a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, actively
take part in it or further it by cooperation or request, who lend aid or
encouragement to the wrongdoers or who ratify or adopt the wrongdoers’
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acts done for their benefit.126 There does not have to be an express
agreement among the defendants; a tacit understanding will suffice.127
Moreover, since all of the defendants who act in concert are liable for the
acts of other defendants, there is no specific causation requirement in such
cases.
Concert of action does not seem to be relevant to opioid litigation.
Although isolated instances of cooperation may have occurred among some
defendants, there does not appear to be any evidence of an industry-wide
conspiracy to defraud the government or the public such as occurred in the
case of asbestos, lead-based paint and tobacco companies in the twentieth
century.128
B. Alternative Liability.
The concept of alternative liability can be traced back to Summers v.
Tice,129 a 1948 landmark decision by the California Supreme Court.130 In
that case, two quail hunters simultaneously fired their shotguns in the
direction of the plaintiff, another member of the hunting party.131 Although
a pellet from one of these shots wounded the plaintiff in the eye, it was
impossible to determine which defendant fired the shot.132 Under the
prevailing special causation rules, the plaintiff would have not been able to
recover against either defendant because he could not identify the one who
negligently fired the injury-causing shot.133 Nevertheless, the trial court,
sitting without a jury, found in favor of the plaintiff.134 On appeal, the
California Supreme Court affirmed.135 The court held that under the
circumstances, the burden was on the defendants to provide exculpatory
126
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evidence.136 Furthermore, in the absence of such evidence, the court ruled
that the defendants would be held jointly and severally liable.137 Although
the Summers decision has not been widely followed, it was adopted by the
Restatement of Torts.138
The Summers court did not provide much guidance about when the
burden of proof with respect to identification should be shifted. 139
Moreover, because few courts have actually applied the alternative liability
rule in subsequent cases,140 its ultimate scope remains a mystery. However,
as one student commentator has pointed out, there are circumstances in the
case that suggest that its scope may be limited.141 First, the defendants were
guilty of similar negligent acts.142 Second, each defendant owed the plaintiff
a duty of care.143 Third, the two causal factors—the shotgun pellets—were
indistinguishable.144 Fourth, and most important, all negligent parties were
joined in the action, thereby eliminating the possibility that two innocent
persons would be held liable for the actions of an unknown third party.145
Finally, because there were only two negligent parties involved, the chance
of either one of the defendants being the guilty party was 50/50, very close
to the conventional “more probable than not” standard.146
It can be seen that some of the factual circumstances in Summers are not
present in the opioid cases. Taking account of all potential defendants, such
as opioid manufacturers, distributors and retail pharmacies as well as
overprescribing doctors, their negligent conduct is not the same.
Manufacturers engaged in fraudulent marketing practices while distributors
and retail sellers fueled a black market in prescription drugs by failing to
monitor and report suspicious orders. In addition, far more than two
defendants are involved in the current opioid litigation.
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C. Enterprise Liability.
The doctrine of enterprise liability also relieves the plaintiff of the duty
to identify the specific cause of his or her harm. The source of the enterprise
liability concept appears to be Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.147 In
that case, the plaintiffs sought damages from six manufacturers and their
trade association, the Institute of Makers of Explosives (I.M.E.) for injuries
sustained by children in separate accidents from blasting caps.148 The
plaintiffs claimed that the products were defective because the
manufacturers did not place warnings on individual blasting caps.149
The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants were aware that children were
frequently injured by blasting caps because the I.M.E., kept statistics and
other information about these accidents.150 Furthermore, the defendants
considered the possibility of labeling individual blasting caps and rejected
it.151 Moreover, they also lobbied against legislation that would have
required such labeling.152
The defendants moved to dismiss the case because most of the plaintiffs
could not identify the specific manufacturer whose product caused their
injury.153 However, the trial court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss
where a plaintiff could not identify the manufacturer of a blasting cap.154
Instead, the court ruled that the burden of showing specific causation should
be shifted to the defendants.155 Furthermore, the court declared that
defendants should be held jointly liable because they jointly controlled the
risk.156 The court based its burden shifting and joint liability holdings on
concerted action and alternative liability theories and identified three factors
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to support them: the defendants’ joint control of the risk, enterprise liability,
in the broad sense of that term,157 and fairness to the plaintiffs.158
None of these considerations apply to opioid litigation. First, while the
defendants may have contributed to the risk of opioid addiction, they did not
control it the way the blasting cap manufacturers did in the Hall case. Nor
did they delegate decisions about product safety to a trade association.
Second, although one can argue that the pharmaceutical industry owes a duty
to the public to protect it from drug-related harm, it is composed of a diverse
group of actors, including manufacturers, distributors, retail sellers and
possibly prescribing physicians. It can hardly be compared to six blasting
cap manufacturers and their trade association as far as being classified as an
“enterprise” is concerned. Finally, there is no fairness issue because
plaintiffs can and have identified most of the wrongdoers.
D. Market Share Liability.
The principle of market share liability was a response by the California
Supreme Court in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories159 to the plight of thousands
of plaintiffs who were injured by Diethylstilbestrol (DES).160 DES is a
synthetic form of estrogen that was developed by British scientists in
1938.161 DES was first marketed in 1947 to prevent miscarriages.162 The
number of women who took the drug ranged from 1.5 million to 3 million.163
Because DES was never patented, it was sold as a generic drug. Over the
years, at least 300 companies manufactured and sold the drug. 164 Pursuant
to a request by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), DES packaging,
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labeling and dosages were made uniform.165 Approximately twenty-five
years after DES was first marketed, it was linked to vaginal and cervical
cancer in the daughters of DES users.166 As a result, in 1971 the FDA banned
DES as a treatment to prevent miscarriages.167
When DES daughters sued drug companies, they often failed to recover
for their injuries because they were unable to prove specific causation.168 In
Sindell, the plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of herself and other
DES affected daughters against eleven DES manufacturers, alleging that her
injuries were caused by the ingestion of DES by her mother during
pregnancy.169 The trial court dismissed the case when it became apparent
that the plaintiff could not identify the manufacturer of the DES that caused
the harm to her.170 However, this decision was reversed on appeal.171
The California Supreme Court conceded that a plaintiff normally has the
burden of proving specific causation.172 It then examined and rejected
various exceptions to the general rule, including alternative liability,173
concert of action,174 and enterprise liability.175 Finally, the court formulated
an approach, loosely based on alternative liability, known as market share
liability.176 Under the market share liability rule, the plaintiff must bring suit
against the manufacturers of a “substantial share” of the DES market from
which her mother may have purchased the DES that caused her daughter’s
injury.177 Next, the plaintiff must show that each of the defendants produced
the type of drug that caused her injuries and that it violated the applicable
standard of care.178 Once the plaintiff satisfies these requirements, the
165
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burden would shift to each defendants to prove that it could not have made
the DES that caused the plaintiff’s harm.179 Any defendant who failed to
exculpate itself will be held liable for a portion of the plaintiff’s damages
that corresponded to its share of the market at the time the plaintiff’s mother
was exposed to DES.180 Unlike alternative liability, there is no joint and
several liability; rather, each defendant will only be liable to the harm that it
is statistically likely to have caused.181
The market share liability approach has not been widely followed by the
courts.182 Nevertheless, it may be useful to transfer certain aspects of it from
the special causation realm to apportionment of damages as it relates to
opioid litigation. In particular, the notion that each defendant’s liability
should be proportional to its market share and that liability should be several
and not joint are worthy of further consideration in the context of opioid
cases and possibly other types of mass tort litigation as well.
E. Specific Causation Issues in Opioid Litigation.
Because of the recordkeeping requirements imposed on all opioid
producers, distributors, retail sellers and prescribers by state and federal
governments, it is unlikely that government plaintiffs will have much
difficulty identifying potential defendants. However, as mentioned above,
courts may import doctrines associated with specific causation, particularly
market share liability, as a means of resolving joint liability and
apportionment of damages issues.
V. PROXIMATE CAUSE.
Proximate cause, sometimes referred to as “legal cause,” 183 reflects a
principle, grounded in public policy, that some limit must be placed on the
imposition of liability for the consequences of an act, even a negligent
one.184 Determining whether the defendant’s conduct is a proximate cause
of the plaintiff’s injury usually involves the question of foreseeability—that
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is, “whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a
likely result of his conduct.”185
Furthermore, proximate cause is often invoked to cut off liability when
other causes have subsequently intervened between the defendant’s conduct
and the plaintiff’s harm.186 Acts or events of this nature are often referred to
as superseding causes.187 Intervening criminal acts are often treated as
superseding causes.188 The defendant in Johnson & Johnson claimed that
the activities of distributors, retail sellers, prescribing doctors and sales of
illegal street drugs constituted superseding causes that were sufficient to
relieve it of liability for causing an opioid-related nuisance.189 However, the
trial court disagreed, concluding that the defendants’ acts were a direct and
proximate cause of the State’s injuries.190 Quoting from Graham v. Keuchel,
the court declared that “[t]o rise to the magnitude of a supervening [sic]
cause, which will insulate the original actor from liability, the new cause
must be (1) independent of the original act, (2) adequate itself to bring about
the result and (3) one whose occurrence was not reasonably foreseeable to
the original actor.”191 Although the court did not identify which elements
were missing, it presumably meant elements 2 and 3. The court apparently
believed that the intervening acts of various third parties were not sufficient
by themselves to cause the opioid epidemic and intervening acts by third
parties were foreseeable by Johnson & Johnson.
In addition, some courts distinguish between a situation where the
defendant’s conduct merely furnishes a condition by which an injury is made
possible, and a third person, acting independently, subsequently causes the
injury.192 In such cases, the creation of the condition by the defendant is not
considered to be the proximate cause of the injury.193 Several courts have
relied on this condition-versus-cause analysis to conclude that the
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defendant’s conduct was not a cause of the plaintiff’s injury.194 For example,
in Ashley County v. Pfizer, Inc.,195 where twenty counties in Arkansas
accused several drug companies of distributing over-the-counter cold
medicines containing ephedrine and pseudoephedrine knowing that these
products would be used by criminals to produce methamphetamine.196 On
appeal from the lower court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ public nuisance and
unjust enrichment claims, a federal appeals court upheld the lower court’s
ruling.197 The court agreed that the defendants’ sale of cold medicine did
not proximately cause the counties to incur increased costs for government
services.198
A New York intermediate appellate court reached a similar conclusion
in People ex rel. Spitzer v. Sturm, Ruger & Co.199 That case involved a
public nuisance action by the State of New York against various handgun
manufacturers, distributors and retail sellers.200 The lower court dismissed
the public nuisance claim and the State appealed.201 However, the appeals
court affirmed the lower court’s ruling, declaring that the connection
between the defendants, criminal wrongdoers and the plaintiff was too
attenuated to satisfy the proximate cause requirement.202 Courts have also
ruled against health care providers and unions on proximate cause grounds
when they have sought to recover against product sellers for costs associated
with the treatment of product-related injuries or diseases.203
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However, in People v. ConAgra Grocery Products Co.,204 another
intermediate appellate court recently concluded that the plaintiff had shown
that the defendants’ marketing practices proximately caused a public
nuisance.205 In that case, the State of California sued manufacturers and
sellers of lead-based paint for allegedly creating a public nuisance in the
State.206 On appeal, the defendants maintained that their promotion and
marketing efforts were too removed from the current public nuisance to be
a proximate cause.207 Instead, they argued that due to the passage of time,
the damage to the state from lead-based paint was “more closely attributable
to owner neglect, renovations, painters, architects, and repainting.”208
However, the appeals court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the
plaintiff had met the proximate cause requirement.209 The court declared
that:
The connection between the long-ago promotions and the
current presence of lead paint was not particularly
attenuated. Those who were influenced by the promotions
to use lead paint on residential interiors in the 10
jurisdictions were the single conduit between defendants’
actions and the current hazard. Under these circumstances,
the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the
defendants’ promotions, which were a substantial factor in
creating the current hazard, were not too remote to be
considered a legal cause of the current hazard even if the
actions of others in response to those promotions and the
passive neglect of owners also played a causal role.210
It remains to be seen whether the ConAgra court’s view of proximate
cause is an outlier, or whether it represents the beginning of a more
expansive treatment of this issue by courts in the future.
Although Judge Balkman in the Johnson & Johnson case rejected the
defendant’s proximate cause argument, it will almost certainly arise again in
other cases. At least in theory, proximate cause seeks to protect a defendant
against liability from the unforeseeable consequences of his or her actions.
204
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However, it is important to distinguish between proximate in this general
sense and proximate cause as it relates to unforeseen intervening causes.
The defendants will have a difficult time convincing a court or jury that they
could not foresee that greatly increasing the production of prescription
opioids could lead to widespread drug abuse. Even if the defendants could
not foresee addiction as a problem when they first developed opioid
painkillers, they certainly knew about it by the year 2000 and yet continued
to promote these products aggressively for another twenty years.
The intervening cause issue is more complicated. In the case of opioids,
the chain of causation is attenuated. Each party can point to someone else
down the causal chain who contributed to the opioid addiction problem.
Manufacturers can blame a host of downstream actors as can distributors.
Retail sellers can blame overprescribing doctors and doctors can blame
opioid abusers and thus claim that the intervening conduct of others was a
superseding cause sufficient to break the chain of causation and relieve the
defendant of liability. Other product sellers successfully relied on this
argument in cases involving ephedrine and pseudoephedrine,211 as well as
cases involving handguns.212 The facts in those cases are sufficiently similar
to the facts in the opioid cases to make things interesting.
VI. JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY.
Ordinarily, if two or more defendants cause a single indivisible injury,
they are treated as joint tortfeasors. Thus, in Johnson & Johnson, if other
drug companies had been found guilty of creating a public nuisance, each of
them would have been liable for the entire cost of abating the nuisance.
However, because the other defendants settled prior to the trial, the court in
that case required Johnson & Johnson to bear the entire cost of the
Oklahoma’s proposed abatement program. Since most of these opioid cases
involve multiple defendants, it will be necessary to examine the concept of
joint and several liability in some detail.
A. Apportionment of Damages.
If two or more tortfeasors independently inflict separate and distinct
injuries upon a plaintiff, each one will be only liable for the damage that he
or she caused to the plaintiff.213 For example, in the absence of concerted
action, the owners of trespassing cattle or dogs who kill sheep are only liable
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for the damage their animals have caused.214 In addition, courts often
apportion damages in private nuisance cases because the interference with
the use of the plaintiff’s land tends to be severable in terms of quantity,
percentage or degree.215 Thus damages have sometimes been apportioned
in flooding and water pollution cases.216
Damages can be apportioned relatively easily when the injuries are
clearly separate, such as when one defendant shoots the plaintiff in the leg
and the other stabs him in the arm. However, apportionment is more
complicated when several defendants commit the same acts and inflict the
same injuries upon the plaintiff. In such cases, courts and juries are forced
to rely on rough estimates in apportioning damages. For example, if five
dogs kill the plaintiff’s sheep and one defendant owns one dog and the other
defendant owns four, it seems appropriate to require the first defendant to
pay twenty percent (20%) of the damage and require the second defendant
to pay eighty percent (80%).217 Likewise, when two or more defendants
pollute a stream, damages can be apportioned according to how much
pollutant each one placed in the stream.218
B. Joint Tortfeasors
Joint tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable to the injured plaintiff.219
Defendants can be treated as joint tortfeasors under the concept of acting in
concert, alternative liability and enterprise liability. Most importantly,
however, they may be held jointly liable if the act concurrently to produce a
single indivisible injury.220
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217 William L. Crowe, Sr., The Anatomy of a Tort—Part V—Apportionment,
Contribution, and Indemnity Among multiple Parties in the Area of Damages—A Second
Reader, 35 LOY. L. REV. 351, 357–58 (1989).
218 Johnson, 247 N.W. at 573; Snavely v. City of Goldendale, 117 P.2d 221, 224–25
(Wash. 1941).
219 KEETON ET AL., supra note 45, § 52, at 347.
220 McGraw v. Weeks, 930 S.W.2d 365, 367–68 (Ark. 1996); Northup v. Eakes, 178 P.
266, 268 (Okla. 1918).

2021]

CAUSATION & APPORTIONMENT IN OPIOID LITIGATION

563

1. Rights of Plaintiffs Against Joint Tortfeasors.
Under the traditional rules of joint and several liability, a plaintiff has
the right to sue one joint tortfeasor, or some of them or all of them in a single
action.221 This means that a plaintiff can focus on a defendant with “deep
pockets” and ignore those who may be judgment proof or might have only
minimal assets even if they are more culpable than the parties being sued.222
A plaintiff can also sue each joint tortfeasor separately, obtaining a separate
judgment against each tortfeasor.223 At the same time, the plaintiff cannot
collect more than once. Once the plaintiff obtains a judgment against one
joint tortfeasor and it is fully satisfied, the plaintiff cannot collect additional
damages from any of the other tortfeasors.224
While satisfaction of a judgment means that the amount of the damage
award is fully paid and, therefore, the right to further compensation is
extinguished, a release is quite different. A release is a surrender of the cause
of action and may be for less than the claim is worth or even gratuitous.
Nevertheless, at one time courts held that a release to one joint tortfeasor
amounted to a complete surrender of any cause of action against another
joint tortfeasor.225 Nowadays, courts are more likely to distinguish between
a release and a covenant not to sue, which does not necessarily release other
tortfeasors.226 However, if one tortfeasor executes a partial settlement with
the plaintiff, the plaintiff may sue the other tortfeasors, but the other
tortfeasors are entitled to have the damage award reduced by the amount of
the settlement.227
2. Rights of Joint Tortfeasors Against Each Other.
Once the plaintiff has been fully compensated, contribution and
indemnity are potentially available to joint tortfeasors to ensure that each
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3 OWEN & DAVIS, supra note 70, § 23:2, at 92 (pointing out that only about twenty
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several liability).
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party pays a fair share of the damage award.228 Contribution is a process by
which a joint tortfeasor may force another tortfeasor to pay a fair share of
compensation to the injured party.229 Most contribution cases involve a joint
tortfeasor who has discharged the group’s entire obligation to the plaintiff
and who now seeks partial reimbursement from the other tortfeasors.230 At
one time, contribution usually required each tortfeasor to pay a pro rata
share of the damage award.231 Thus, if three joint tortfeasors harmed the
plaintiff, each could be made to pay one-third of the damage award.
However, some states, influenced by comparative fault systems applicable
to plaintiffs and defendants, have imported this concept into contribution
cases so that liability is based on the degree of fault involved rather than
being imposed in equal shares.232
While a contribution action can be brought after one tortfeasor has paid
the plaintiff, it is often cheaper and more efficient to determine contribution
issues, along with defendants’ liability to the plaintiff, in one proceeding.
Therefore, under modern pleading rules, if the plaintiff sues only some of
the potential joint tortfeasors, they may bring the remaining tortfeasors into
the case as third party defendants. If the jury finds the original defendants
to be liable, it can then determine how much the third-party defendants
should pay as contribution.233
In contrast to contribution, indemnity shifts liability entirely from one
tortfeasor to another once the plaintiff has been compensated. The right to
indemnification may arise from a contract, it may be based on a relationship
such as employer and employee and it may arise when party is substantially
more culpable than another.234 For example, an employer who is held
vicariously liable to the plaintiff for the negligence of an employee could
theoretically seek indemnification from the employee once it has paid the
plaintiff’s damage award. Likewise, a tortfeasor who is passively negligent
could seek indemnification from a tortfeasor who was actively negligent.235
Of course, neither contribution nor indemnity are necessary if the plaintiff’s damages
have been apportioned among the various tortfeasors. See Crowe, supra note 217, at 354,
361, 377.
229 Id. at 361.
230
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231 KEETON ET AL., supra note 45, § 51, at 344.
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233 Id. § 51, at 340–41.
234 Vermeer Carolina’s, Inc. v. Wood/Chuck Chipper Corp., 518 S.E.2d 301, 305 (S.C.
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C. Joint and Several Liability Issues in Opioid Litigation.
Although some government plaintiffs have alleged that drug companies
and others engaged in a conspiracy to defraud the FDA, prescribing doctors
and the general public, it is questionable whether they can provide enough
evidence to support a claim of joint and several liability based on concert of
action. Instead, a claim of joint and several liability is more likely to be
based on the theory that the various defendants acted independently to create
a single indivisible harm, namely a public nuisance involving widespread
opioid addiction. Presumably, the trial judge in the Johnson & Johnson case
accepted this theory since he ruled that Johnson & Johnson must pay for the
entire cost of the State’s proposed abatement plan. Furthermore, if other
cases go to trial, government plaintiffs will no doubt also seek to hold the
defendants jointly and severally liable on this indivisible injury theory.
It is curious to note that the State of Oklahoma did not join many other
manufacturers, distributors, or retail pharmacies as defendants in the
Johnson & Johnson case, though a few additional companies were initially
named as defendants.236 Nor did Johnson & Johnson implead any other
defendants. Presumably, neither side wanted to clutter up the litigation with
numerous other parties.
It is possible to view Johnson & Johnson as a test case in which both
sides wanted to focus on just a few issues. If that is the case, one can expect
subsequent cases to be considerably more complicated as additional
defendants and third-party defendants join in the fray. Indemnity is unlikely
to be involved, but contribution problems will certainly arise in future cases.
One likely issue will be how liability is apportioned among joint tortfeasors
in a contribution action. Given the allegedly different degrees of culpability
among the various defendants, apportionment on a pro rata basis hardly
seems fair. On the other hand, in view of the fact that different classes of
defendants—manufacturers, distributors, retail pharmacies, and prescribing
physicians—evaluating culpability seems like comparing apples and
oranges. It remains to be seen how courts will sort this out.
Another issue involves settlements. As mentioned earlier, a joint
tortfeasor who settles with the plaintiff normally cannot be forced to
contribute further. This could raise fairness problems if government
plaintiffs settled with some defendants for modest amounts early in the
litigation process either because they wanted to focus on deep pocket targets
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or because they needed money to finance existing litigation expenses.
Another issue that was raised, but not resolved, in Johnson & Johnson is
whether the remaining defendants should be entitled to a setoff for money
paid to the plaintiff by settling defendants. While this is usually the case,
the court in Johnson & Johnson seemed to think that settlement money
earmarked for addiction treatment should not be deducted from money that
was designated for abatement programs. It remains to be seen watch other
courts will do in similar circumstance.
VII.

A MARKET SHARE BASED PROPOSAL.

The Johnson & Johnson case raises concerns about the imposition of
joint and several liability in mass tort cases in general and opioid litigation
in particular. Arguably, some sort of market share approach may be a
superior approach to the problem of apportioning responsibility fairly in
such cases.
A. Problems with Joint and Several Liability.
The principle of joint and several liability is supported by a number of
considerations. From a doctrinal perspective, joint and several liability is
justified because the defendants have acted in concert to inflict harm on the
plaintiff or they have breached a common duty to the plaintiff or their
independent actions have led to a single indivisible harm to the plaintiff.237
Another consideration is that a plaintiff should not be left without a remedy
when the conduct of the defendants makes it difficult to apportion
damages.238 A final justification is that the risk that some of the defendants
may be insolvent or unavailable for suit should fall on the rest of the
tortfeasors and not on the plaintiff.239
However, joint and several liability is subject to criticism. One concern
is that corporations and other well-off defendants are more likely to pay most
of the damage award, while other tortfeasors, including those who are more
culpable, may pay token settlements or even nothing at all. Although the
defendants who pay may seek contribution from those who initially escape
liability, contribution actions, like other lawsuits, may be time-consuming
and expensive.
The arguments for and against joint and several liability discussed above
are particularly applicable to routine negligence cases like automobile
237
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accidents where there is one individual plaintiff and two or three defendants,
and their liability insurer. However, additional considerations may be
involved in mass tort cases such as opioid litigation. First, when large
numbers of defendants are involved, it is desirable for corrective justice and
deterrence reasons that as many culpable parties as possible bear a share of
the damage award and that no defendant escape liability. In addition, when
a large number of plaintiffs are suing, it is better to avoid placing the entire
burden on a few defendants. If this occurs, some of these defendants (as
well as their employees and shareholders) may suffer severe economic harm.
B. Should Market Share Liability Be Applied to Opioid Litigation?
In Sindell, the California Supreme Court declared that each defendant
who manufactured and sold DES in the state during the time the plaintiff’s
mother consumed the drug should pay a portion of the damage award that
was equivalent to its share of the market during that time period.240 Market
share liability thus relieved the plaintiff from having to prove specific
causation in such cases.241 My proposal would apply the principle of market
share liability to damage awards in opioid cases and possibly to other types
of mass tort cases as well. Like the version adopted by the California
Supreme Court in Sindell, my proposal would apportion liability among the
defendants rather than holding them jointly liable.
To be sure, there are significant differences between Sindell and opioid
cases such as Johnson & Johnson. First, market share liability in Sindell
was concerned with the issue of specific causation.242 In Sindell, through no
fault of their own, DES daughters were generally unable to identify the
manufacturers of the DES that caused their harm.243 In contrast, specific
causation should not be much of a problem in opioid litigation.
Second, market share liability in Sindell was intended to protect the
interests of plaintiffs who would otherwise not be compensated because of
their failure to prove specific causation.244 In opioid litigation, market share
liability is intended to protect the interests of the defendant drug companies
and by extension, the interests of consumers of prescription painkillers and
other drugs.245 The question of whether these interests are worthy of
protection will be addressed below.
240

Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 937–38 (Cal. 1980).
Id. at 936
242 Id. at 937.
243 Id. at 936.
244 Id.
245 See id. at 940 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
241

568

CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[49:535

Third, unlike Sindell, where market share liability was only applied to
DES daughters who suffered personal injuries, the market share scheme
described below would only protect the economic interests of government
entities. Furthermore, market share liability, if adopted, would be limited to
reimbursing state and local governments for the cost of abating public
nuisances caused by opioid addiction.
C. The Proposal.
Market share liability means that the government plaintiff may obtain a
judgment or decree in an abatement action from each defendant by requiring
it to contribute an amount based on its share of the overall market or on some
other objective basis. Liability would, therefore, be several and not joint.
Market share could be based on gross sales of opioids or morphine milligram
equivalents (MMEs) for all companies that manufactured or sold
prescription opioids during the period covered by the applicable statute of
limitations.246 Moreover, market share liability would only be applied to
government entities that had developed detailed abatement plans. This
would prevent, or at least discourage, governments from devoting the
proceeds of opioid litigation to other purposes as happened in the tobacco
settlement.247 In order for abatement to be available, the court would have
to conclude that the marketing, distribution and sale of prescription opioids
led to the creation of a public nuisance. However, since the requirements
for public nuisance vary from state to state, there may not be any public
nuisance to abate in some states.248
A simpler and more manageable approach, adopted by the Sindell court,
would be to require the plaintiff to join a “substantial” percentage of the
market and use their aggregate sales as the denominator in calculating the
share of each of the defendants. Thus, market share would not include illegal
sales of illegal street drugs such as heroin or nonprescription fentanyl.
To discourage government plaintiffs from “cherry picking” defendants,
and to encourage the inclusion of all responsible parties, market share would
246
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be calculated insofar as possible on the entire market. For example, if total
prescription opioid sales amounted to $10 billion and Defendant A’s share
of this was $1 billion, that defendant’s liability would be capped at ten
percent (10%) of the total or $1 billion. If all of the defendants involved in
the litigation only constituted eighty percent (80%) of the market, Defendant
A’s share would still not exceed $1 billion. In other words, the defendants
who were sued would not have to make up the share of those who were not
sued.
D. Justifications for Applying Market Share Liability to Opioids.
Why utilize the concept of market share liability in opioid litigation
when it has not been widely accepted for its original purpose as a mechanism
for enabling plaintiffs to avoid the necessity of proving specific causation?
This is a fair question, and I would acknowledge that if market share liability
is to be applied in this new context, it must be justified by persuasive policy
arguments.
1. Corrective Justice.
First, market share liability in this context is consistent with corrective
justice, as is joint and several liability. In its traditional form, corrective
justice is concerned with the problem of unjust enrichment that occurs when
a defendant improperly obtains something at the expense of another.249 In
such cases, corrective justice requires that property wrongfully acquired be
returned to its rightful owner.250 For some, this version of corrective justice
can be expanded to justify compensating an injured party even when the
defendant has not received a financial gain at the his or her expense.251 It is
even possible to invoke principles of corrective justice to impose a duty to
compensate those who are injured by a defendant’s lawful but risk-creating
activities.252 These nontraditional concepts of corrective justice might,
therefore, justify requiring opioid producers and others who profited from
the sale of prescription opioids to contribute to the cost of abating the
resulting opioid epidemic. Otherwise, state and local governments, which
did not contribute or profit from sale of opioids, will be forced to bear the
249
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entire cost of responding to the opioid addiction problem. Arguably, market
share liability, like joint and several liability, is consistent with the objectives
of corrective justice.
2. Retributive Justice.
Given the wrongful conduct of many opioid sellers, principles of
retributive justice would also seem to be relevant. Retributive justice
dictates that actors be punished when they voluntarily and inexcusably
commit a wrongful act.253 However, principles of retributive justice also
require that any punishment imposed on a wrongdoer be reasonably
proportioned to the seriousness of the offense.254 Although neither
compensatory damages nor abatement costs are normally thought of as
punishment, retributive justice considerations may be relevant in deciding
whether to adopt market share liability instead of joint and several liability
in opioid cases.
First, insofar as retributive justice requires that wrongdoers be punished,
it would seem that a liability rule that affects most members of a group of
tortfeasors is preferable to a liability rule that includes only a few members
of the group and lets the rest of them off. This issue arose in the Johnson &
Johnson case, where the trial court required a single defendant to pay for the
entire cost of abatement while most of the other opioid sellers, including
some highly culpable ones like Purdue, escaped largely unscathed.255
Therefore, because market share liability is likely to ensnare more
wrongdoers than joint and several liability, it would seem to be the better
choice. Another advantage of market share liability is that it ensures that the
share that each defendant pays is roughly proportional to its contribution to
the opioid problem.
Market share liability is also more consistent with the proportionality
norm embodied in the concept of retributive justice. If the principle of joint
and several liability is applied, there is a real possibility that a few unlucky
defendants may be forced to pay billions of dollars to abate the costs of
opioid addiction. For some of these defendants, liability of this size may be
tantamount to a corporate death penalty. In contrast, market share liability
253
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will spread the cost of abatement among a greater group of defendants and
thus reduce the chances of a wipeout.
3. Deterrence and Overdeterrence.
An important objective of tort liability is to deter certain types of
conduct.256 An actor who is able to externalize certain costs to others, is
unlikely to change his or her behavior unless these costs are shifted back in
the form of tort liability. This sort of deterrence is relatively easy to achieve
if there is only one defendant. However, the deterrent effect of tort liability
will be weakened when multiple parties have contributed to the plaintiff’s
injury unless all of them have to pay a share of the damage award. In
Johnson & Johnson, only one defendant had to pay (and was presumably
deterred from engaging in future wrongful conduct), while the other opioid
sellers who escaped liability would not have necessarily been deterred by
what befell Johnson & Johnson. Thus, market share liability enhances the
deterrent effect of tort liability by spreading it among all of the wrongdoers
(or at least most of them) rather than having it potentially fall on only a few.
Not only is it important to achieve optimal deterrence, but it is also
desirable to avoid excess deterrence or overdeterrence. Overdeterrence
occurs when the fear of potential liability causes actors to refrain from
engaging in socially useful but dangerous conduct.257 For example, in the
1970s, drug companies refused to produce Swine Flu vaccine until the
federal government agreed to immunize them from liability.258 In addition,
during the childhood vaccine crisis of the 1980s, fear of massive tort liability
allegedly caused many diphtheria, tetanus and pertussis (DPT) vaccine
manufacturers to quit making these products. Consequently, lack of
competition and the high cost of liability insurance caused the price of
childhood vaccines to rise from 11 cents per dose in 1982 to $11.40 per dose
in 1986., a tenfold increase during this period.259 Ultimately, Congress
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enacted legislation to protect vaccine manufacturers against an expected
avalanche of tort liability.260
This concern is also relevant to opioid producers. Prescription drugs,
including opioid painkillers, are socially useful products when marketed
responsibly. If one producer may be held potentially liable for the entire
cost of opioid abatement, like Johnson & Johnson, it is possible that the
entire industry will be excessively deterred. Unlike joint and several
liability, market share eliminates this risk and, therefore, reduces the chances
of overdeterrence while retaining the deterrent effect of tort liability for the
entire industry.
E. Abatement Versus Damage Awards.
The proposed market share approach is limited to abatement cases. That
is not to say that it might be useful in other situations such as damage awards
or settlement cases. However, there are certain aspects of abatement as a
remedy when a state or local government is called upon to deal with a
nuisance situation.
First, there are important conceptual differences between damage
awards and abatement. Damage awards are concerned with compensating a
plaintiff for past injuries. Consequently, they are backward-looking. In
contrast, abatement is concerned with mitigating future damages and is,
therefore, forward-looking. Furthermore, there are certain advantages for
government plaintiffs who choose abatement over damage claims. Most
importantly, unlike settlements and damage awards, abatement decrees,
which are equitable in nature, are earmarked for a particular purpose and are,
therefore, harder for the state to divert these funds for other purposes. To be
sure, abatement costs may be smaller than damage awards because they
exclude certain components, such as law enforcement costs and quality of
life that might be recoverable as part of a damage award. In addition, a
government plaintiff would presumably not be able to seek punitive
damages in an abatement case. This may or may not be a good thing.
Finally, damage awards are usually determined by a jury, often without
much guidance from the court. In contrast, if the Johnson & Johnson case
is any guide, a defendant will only be used to finance an abatement effort
when the government plaintiff has developed a specific and detailed plan
which is supported by credible cost estimates. This requirement, if followed
in other cases, will prevent a state or local government from transforming
260

See generally National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1
to -34 (2018); see also Okianer Christian Dark, Is the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
of 1986 the Solution For the DTP Controversy?, 19 U. TOL. L. REV. 799, 839–50 (1988).
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their abatement plan into a Christmas wish list of unnecessary or unrelated
requests.
VIII.

CONCLUSION.

In Johnson & Johnson, a liberal application of the substantial test of
cause-in-fact, coupled with summary dismissal of proximate cause and the
imposition of joint and several liability resulted in a trial court ruling that the
defendant pay for the entire cost of abating an opioid addiction based public
nuisance, at least for the first year.261 This seems unfair considering that
many other opioid producers also contributed to the opioid epidemic and got
off scot free.262 Assuming that there is no “global” settlement in the near
future, other cases will go to trial, particularly at the state level, and at least
some will reach the same result as the Johnson & Johnson case.
To avoid such an unfortunate result, in this Article I propose an
alternative approach. Assuming that cause-in-fact and proximate cause
requirements are satisfied, which they probably will be in most cases, the
court should apportion responsibility for abating the public nuisance caused
by opioid producers on some form of market share liability rather than
imposing joint and several liability on a few of them. This approach is more
consistent with normative values and deterrence objectives than joint and
several liability.
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See State ex rel. Hunter v. Purdue Pharma L.P. See generally No. CJ-2017-816, 2019
Okla. Dist. LEXIS 3486, at *38–43, *62–63 (Okla. Dis. Ct. Aug. 26, 2019).
262 See, e.g., Bebinger, supra note 24 (describing Purdue’s settlement); Drash, supra note
25 (describing Teva’s settlement).

